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NOTES

No Vacancy: Why Immigrant Housing
Ordinances Violate FHA and Section 1981
I.

INTRODUCTION
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempesttost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!'

The United States has always faced immigration challenges.
After the Pilgrims established the first U.S. colony in New England,2 an
ensuing immigration stream grew the U.S. population to over 300 million
people within 386 years.3 This population growth has increased the
demands for social services and the costs required to maintain
infrastructure.4 As one response to these rising costs and other
immigration concerns, state and municipal governments have enacted
local laws to regulate immigrant housing.'
I EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in 1 THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS, at 203
(Cambridge, The Riverside Press 1888). These words have adomed the Statue of Liberty for over a
century, welcoming millions of immigrants to the United States. See Statue of Liberty Nat'l
Monument-History & Culture (U.S. Nat'l Park Serv.), http://www.nps.gov/stli/historyculture/index.htm
(follow "The New Colossus Sonnet at Statue of Liberty" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 5, 2008)
(noting history of the Statue of Liberty and providing background on the sonnet).
2 See United States of America, 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 149, 203-04 (noting

that the Pilgrims established the first permanent U.S. colony in New England in 1620).
The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the U.S. population surpassed 300 million
people on October 17, 2006. Additionally, the bureau estimates that international migration adds one
person to the population every thirty-one seconds. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News,
Nation's Population to Reach 300 Million on Oct. 17 (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/populationlOO7616.htmi (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
4 See Marshall Coover, Comment, Put Me in the Game, Coach: Texas Should Accept
the Invitations from Congress, the FederalJudiciary,and the U.S. Department of Justicefor States
to Join the Immigration Law Enforcement Team, 39 TEX. TECH L. REv. 315, 317 (2007) (arguing
that states should supplement federal enforcement of immigration laws due to the costs that
immigrants impose on states).
5 At least six municipalities have passed immigrant housing ordinances. FARMERS
BRANCH, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 26, art. IV, § 26-116(f) (2006) [hereinafter Farmers
Branch Ordinance], invalidated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp.
2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007), availableat http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/
Ordinance%2ONo%202892.html; Escondido, Ca., Ordinance No. 2006-38 R (Oct. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter Escondido Ordinance], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/escondido-
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Yet while Congress has exclusive power to regulate
immigration, there is no per se federal preemption of every state and
municipal immigration law.6 Rather, federal immigration laws only
preempt those state and municipal laws that specify which immigrants
may enter the United States and the conditions under which those
immigrants may remain.7 In Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch,' the Northern District of Texas enjoined a municipal

ordinance.pdf; Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance No. 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Cherokee
County Ordinance], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/cherokeecountyordinance.pdf; Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Valley Park
Ordinance], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleyparkamendedordinance.pdf;
Riverside, N.J., Ordinance No. 2006-16 (July 26, 2006) [hereinafter Riverside Ordinance], available
at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/riverside-firstordinance.pdf; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No.
2006-10 (July 13, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-00010003.pdf (regulating employment and harboring of unlawful immigrants); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance
No. 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrantslhazletonfirstordinance.pdf (requiring apartment dwellers to obtain occupancy permits after establishing
citizenship or lawful residence); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No. 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available
at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf (regulating employment
and housing of unlawful immigrants and together with Ordinance No. 2006-19, replacing Ordinance
No. 2006-10); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No. 2006-19 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-19%20_Official%2OEnglish.pdf
(declaring
English as the official language of Hazleton); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No. 2006-40 (Dec. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrantshazleton-thirdordinance.pdf (amendment to
provide "implementation and process" section) [hereinafter, collectively, Hazleton Ordinances].
While statutes have not generally regulated immigrant housing, Oklahoma recently
enacted House Bill 1804, the "Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007," which
regulates harboring, employing or providing housing to unlawful immigrants. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 446 (West Supp. 2008) (effective Nov. 1, 2007). Anyone who violates this section is guilty of a
felony and punishable by at least one-year imprisonment and/or a $1000 fine. § 446(D). The statute
also restricts organizations' abilities to issue identification documents to unlawful immigrants.
§ 1550.42(B)-(D). Further, when an individual is confined in jail or questioned by the police, law
enforcement has the authority to make reasonable efforts to determine an arrestee's immigration
status. Tit. 22, § 171.2; see also tit. 25, § 1313 (prohibiting public employers from contracting with
any unlawful immigrants); tit. 56, § 71 (prohibiting unlawful immigrants from receiving any federal,
state or municipal benefits).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (vesting in Congress the power to establish a "uniform
Rule of Naturalization"); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."); id. at 355 ("[T]he Court has never
held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration
and thus per se pre-empted .... ").
7 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (Regulation of immigration is "essentially a determination
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain.").
496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007). The facts of the FarmersBranch case are as
follows: the plaintiffs included both property renters and property owners. Id. at 763 n.3. The
property renters included two permanent residents and five U.S. citizens. Verified Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
7-8, 10-12, Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (No. 06-CV-2376) [hereinafter Farmers Branch
Verified Complaint]. Both permanent residents lived in an apartment complex with some family
members who were neither U.S. citizens nor resident immigrants. Id H 7-8. The five U.S. citizens
were children who lived with their families in apartment complexes. Id. U 10-12. Some of the
family members were neither U.S. citizens nor resident immigrants. Id.
10-12.
The property managers operated two apartment complexes in Farmers Branch. Id.
T 15-16. They did not know the immigration status of their tenants and did not require proof of
citizenship or immigration status before renting tenants an apartment. Id. 17. Further, their leases
with tenants comprehensively stated the circumstances under which they may evict a tenant or
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ordinance that regulated immigrant housing.9 The court held that federal
authority preempted the municipal ordinance because the ordinance
enacted a locally prescribed framework to determine which immigrants
could rent apartments. ° However, the court suggested that it would
affirm an ordinance that deferred to federal immigration standards."
Such deference is problematic because while border
communities might prioritize immigration concerns, regulation of
immigrant housing is a national problem that requires a uniform, federal
approach. 2 It directly implicates political functions involving foreign
affairs and relations, 3 an area where federal courts typically defer to the
Executive Branch. 4 When state and municipal governments regulate
immigrant housing, local policies proclaim who is and is not welcome in
the local jurisdiction. 5 These actions encumber the United States' ability
terminate the tenancy. These circumstances did not include provisions regarding immigration status.
Id. 118.
9 FarmersBranch, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
10 Id. ("Farmers Branch... has created its own classification scheme for determining
which noncitizens may rent an apartment in that city... [blecause Farmers Branch has attempted to
regulate immigration differently from the federal government, the Ordinance is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.").
" See id. The court explained:
Farmers Branch has failed to adopt federal immigration standards. The Ordinance adopts
federal housing regulations that govern which noncitizens may receive housing subsidies
from the federal government, not federal immigration standards that determine which
noncitizens are legally in this country. Because Farmers Branch has attempted to regulate
immigration differently from the federal government, the Ordinance is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.
Id.
12 The federal government has uniformly regulated many social welfare programs with
an initial disparate impact on Border States. As the Supreme Court has noted:
It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to exclude undocumented
immigrants from numerous social welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, the
old-age assistance, aid to families with dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the
permanently and totally disabled, and supplemental security income programs, the
Medicare hospital insurance benefits program, and the Medicaid hospital insurance
benefits for the aged and disabled program.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 251 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
13 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("It is pertinent to observe
that any policy toward immigrants is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations... [S]uch matters are so exclusively entrusted
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.").
14 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)
("[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context
where officials 'exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations."' (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))).
15 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 528 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (Since
"[e]xcessive enforcement [of immigration laws] jeopardizes our alliances and cooperation with
regard to matters such as immigration enforcement, drug interdiction and counter-terrorism
investigations," the federal government is responsible for achieving balanced enforcement of
immigration laws.).
Additionally, statements from residents in Riverside, New Jersey, demonstrate that the
goal of anti-immigrant ordinances may be to drive out unlawful immigrants, regardless of whether
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to speak with one voice, affect perceptions of federal immigration
policies, and affect the national welfare. 6 Further, the local officials
responsible for the actions are not politically accountable to the entire
nation.' 7 For these reasons, this Note argues that state and municipal
governments should refrain from regulating immigrant housing and
producing inconsistent approaches to a common problem.
This Note also argues that the most practical challenges to these
state and municipal anti-immigrant laws arise under both the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA")' s and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
("Section 1981").' 9 FHA prohibits property owners and managers from
engaging in practices that discriminate against tenants based on race,
color, or national origin. 0 Section 1981 provides anyone within U.S.
jurisdiction, regardless of race, ethnicity, or national origin, the right to
contract and to receive full and equal treatment under the laws."' Since it
is unlikely that Congress will expeditiously enact federal regulation of
immigrant housing, local residents must challenge these anti-immigrant
laws through the judicial process.2
In this Note, Part II analyzes common problems and legal
deficiencies with state and municipal efforts to regulate immigrant
housing. Part III argues that the most practical challenges to these state
and municipal laws arise under both FHA and Section 1981, and Part IV
concludes that comprehensive regulation would address the immigration
problem, while avoiding fundamental legal deficiencies.
the federal government decided to remove the immigrants. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns
Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al.
16 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 711 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Jiudicial
orders requiring release of removable aliens, even on a temporary basis, have the potential to
undermine the obvious necessity that the Nation speak with one voice on immigration and foreign
affairs matters."). Further, negative perceptions of the United States might reduce tourist revenues,
reduce foreign demand for U.S. products, hinder national efforts to negotiate favorable trade
agreements, and hinder national abilities to build coalitions to address global issues.
17 Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) (accountability to constituents
is
a "sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation"). In McCulloch, the Court
prohibited states from taxing non-constituents. For similar reasons, only nationally accountable
officials should legislate on issues affecting immigration and foreign affairs.
18 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2000).
19 Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
20 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief
Act
Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051-53 (2007)
(arguing that "immigrant restriction bills" violate FHA).
21 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987) ("Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are
subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.");
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976) (Section 1981 "proscribe[s]
discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race."); Lozano
v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 546 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (striking down the Hazleton
Ordinances, supra note 5, as violations of Section 1981).
22 Immigration reform is a controversial subject in Congress. In June
2007, the U.S.
Senate killed the latest efforts for reform. Senate Immigration Bill Suffers Crushing Defeat,
http://www.cnn.com12007/POLITICS/06/28/immigration.congresslindex.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2008).
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LOCAL EFFORTS TO REGULATE IMMIGRANT HOUSING
UNDERMINE SUPERIOR POWERS, VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS, AND DAMAGE LOCAL
COMMUNITIES

State and municipal efforts to regulate immigrant housing have
increased due to the expense that immigrants impose on local
governments. 3 Frustrated by the perceived apathy of the federal
government, state and municipal governments are using the state's police
power to regulate immigrant housing.24 The police power permits states
to regulate "the public health, the public morals [and] the public
safety."25 These local efforts, however, do not comprehensively address
the national problem. Rather, they produce piecemeal regulation with
fundamental legal deficiencies. For instance, municipal efforts are
inconsistent with many federal and state laws.26 Additionally, they
infringe on due process and equal protection rights, destroy local
camaraderie and stifle economic development.27 These deficiencies affect
the national welfare and obstruct efforts for comprehensive reform. For
many of these reasons, local residents have challenged and defeated
many of these anti-immigrant ordinances.
A.

Federaland State Sovereignty Preempt Local Efforts to Regulate
Immigrant Housing

The Constitution establishes the supremacy of federal laws,
which preempt all inconsistent state and municipal laws. Since the
federal government has the exclusive power to regulate immigration29
and foreign affairs,3" state and municipal efforts to regulate immigrant
23
24

See Coover, supra note 4, at 317.
Id. at 318; American Civil Liberties Union: Immigrant Rights: Discrimination,

http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/index.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (noting local attempts
at "punishing" people who rent housing to immigrants).
25 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
26 See infra Part I.A.
27 See infra Part II.B (due process deficiencies), Part I.C (equal protection deficiencies),
Part II.D (impacts on local camaraderie and economic development); see also Campbell, supra note
20, at 1041 (Local measures "violate the Constitution, and pit neighbor against neighbor.
Immigration policy must be established and enforced at the federal level, as local ordinances
threaten to discriminate against all Latinos ... .
28 The Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § i, cl.
2.
29 See supra note 6.
30 See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (discussing federal supremacy
over foreign affairs).
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matters often conflict with federal power. Likewise, state constitutions3
and supreme court decisions32 establish the supremacy of state laws over
all inconsistent municipal ordinances. Since state property laws govern
the landlord-tenant relationship, municipal regulations of immigrant
housing conflict with state power, as the municipal regulations compel
property owners and managers to contravene state property laws.33 For
these reasons, several courts have held that federal and state laws
preempt municipal anti-immigrant ordinances.
In Farmers Branch, the Northern District of Texas held that
federal immigration laws preempted a municipal ordinance that
effectively determined which immigrants could enter the United States
and under which conditions those immigrants could remain.' The town
of Farmers Branch enacted an ordinance under its municipal police
power to protect the health, safety, and well-being of its residents.35 The
ordinance required property owners and managers to document
prospective tenants' citizenship or eligible immigration status36 prior to
entering rental arrangements.37 The ordinance further required that every

31 See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("This constitution shall be the supreme law of the
state, and any law inconsistent therewith, shall be void."); ME. CONST. art. X, § 6 ("And the
Constitution, with the amendments made thereto... shall be the supreme law of the State.").
32 See, e.g., Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 154 P.3d 1003, 1013 (Cal. 2007) (Kennard, J.,
concurring) ("The California Constitution is 'the supreme law of the state' to which all statutes must
conform." (citations omitted)); Dickson v. Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012, 1021 (Tex. 1924) ("The
Constitution is the supreme law of the state.").
33 See generally Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802 (Mo. 21st Jud. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfslimmigrants/valleypark-opinion.pdf. In
Reynolds, the court enjoined the enforcement of a local ordinance that authorized penalties that
conflicted with state law. Further, the ordinance penalized property owners who did not evict
immigrants within five days. Missouri housing laws require property owners to provide at least thirty
days notice and to use the judicial process to evict a tenant. See infra notes 65 & 67.
34 Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777 (N.D. Tex.
2007).
35 Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f). While Farmers Branch enacted
the ordinance under its police power, the ordinance's first declaration states that there is a need to
protect its citizens from September I 1th-like terrorist attacks. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No.
2892
(Nov. 13,
2006),
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/farmersbranch-ordinance.pdf
("Whereas, in response to the widespread concern of future terrorist attacks following the events of
September 11, 2001, landlords and property managers throughout the country have been developing
new security procedures to protect their buildings and residents .... "). The complaint states facts
leading up to the ordinance's enactment, which suggest the ordinance targets Latinos. There is no
evidence in the record suggesting a link between immigrants renting housing and propensities to
commit terrorist attacks. See Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, s,.'pra note 8,
26-32.
36 Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f0(3). U.S. citizens and nationals
must provide a signed declaration of citizenship or nationality and confirm eligibility by providing
either a U.S. passport or other acceptable form as designated by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"). Other non-citizens must provide a signed declaration of eligibility, an
acceptable form as designated by ICE, and a signed verification consent form.
37 Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f)(2) ("The owner and/or property
manager shall require as a prerequisite to entering into any lease or rental arrangement, including
any lease or rental renewals or extensions, the submission of evidence of citizenship or eligible
immigration status for each tenant family ... ").
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family member provide eligibility documentation, regardless of age?
Then, the ordinance burdened property owners by requiring them to
enforce the municipal ordinance.39 The ordinance authorized the city to
fine violators up to $500 for each day that a violation occurred or
continued.'
Yet the Farmers Branch Ordinance had two fundamental legal
deficiencies. First, the ordinance was inconsistent with the political
accountability doctrine.4' The goal of political accountability is to protect
state legislators and executives from bearing the public disapproval for
federal decisions while denying federal officials political insulation.42
The Farmers Branch Ordinance presented a reverse political
accountability problem-the local officials were insulated. Regulation of
immigrant housing sends a reverberating message of who is and is not
welcome in communities. Naturally, these actions implicate political
functions involving foreign affairs and relations. 3 Yet since local
officials are only accountable to the local electorate, they have little
incentive to consider the national well-being before acting.
Consequently, this lack of political accountability creates a perverse
incentive to export immigration costs to neighboring communities. Such
actions obstruct national efforts to address a common problem.
Second, by adopting U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") subsidy classifications and utilizing them to
specify who could and could not rent housing, the ordinance de facto
regulated immigration and was preempted by federal law.' Under the
ordinance, property owners and managers could only rent to U.S.
citizens, nationals, and non-citizens with eligible immigration status.45
38 Id. § 26-116(f)(3) ("Each family member, regardless of age, must submit [evidence of

citizenship or eligible immigration status] to the owner and/or property manager.").
39 Id. § 26-116(f)(4)(i). The property owner or manager must review the original
documents for each tenant or family member and retain copies for at least two years following the
end of a lease. Every tenant and family member must provide evidence of citizenship and a property
owner or manager may not allow any unverified person to occupy the premises. Id.
40 Id. § 26-116(f).
41 Political accountability is the doctrine that legislators and executives should answer to
the electorate. The electorate should only hold those persons enacting or enforcing a law accountable
for that law. Accordingly, the political process should not hold persons who did not enact laws or
who are not responsible for enforcing laws accountable for those laws. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) (invalidating a state tax on the national bank because the persons
that paid the tax lacked representation in the political body enacting the tax); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (the federal government cannot compel state law enforcement
officers to enforce federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (the federal
government cannot compel state legislatures to participate in a federal regulatory program).
42 New York, 505 U.S. at 169 ("[Wjhere the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications
of their decision.").
43 See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
44 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (N.D.
Tex. 2007).
45 Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5,§ 26-116(0.
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The ordinance defined eligible immigration status as those persons
eligible for federal housing subsidies.' Yet federal housing subsidies are
not available to several lawfully admitted immigrant groups, such as
tourists, diplomats, and students.47 Since the ordinance would exclude
these persons from renting apartments in Farmers Branch, the ordinance
was a regulation of immigration and preempted by federal law. 48 By
excluding lawfully admitted persons from renting housing, Farmers
Branch had disregarded a federal regulatory scheme and obstructed
efforts for a comprehensive, national approach to a common problem.
In another case, Lozano v. City of Hazleton,49 the Middle District
of Pennsylvania held that federal preemption was one reason to
invalidate local anti-immigrant ordinances." The Hazleton Ordinances
regulated both immigrant employment and housing, while authorizing
civil sanctions for violations.51 However, the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") expressly preempts any state or municipal
law that imposes civil or criminal sanctions for violations of a local
immigrant employment regulatory scheme.2 Under the Hazleton
Ordinances,53 the city could suspend a business permit for violations of
the local ordinance.54 While IRCA allows local governments to suspend
business permits for violations of IRCA, it prohibits local governments

46 FarmersBranch, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 767. Federal housing subsidies constitute
various
forms of financial assistance that the United States government provides lower income households to
make housing more affordable. These subsidies include programs such as privately owned
subsidized housing, public housing, housing choice voucher programs and tax incentives for home
purchases or improvements. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., Programs of
HUD, available at http://www.huduser.org/resources/hudprgs/ProgOfHlUD06.pdf (last visited Sept.
6, 2008).
47 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1436a(a)(1) (2000) (HUD may not provide federal
housing
subsidies to "alien visitors, tourists, diplomats, and students who enter the United States temporarily
with no intention of abandoning their residence in a foreign country ... .
48 See Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
49 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (invalidating an anti-immigrant
ordinance
with a sweeping opinion that explores many of the available challenges to these types of ordinances).
In Lozano, the court invalidated the ordinances on several grounds, including federal
preemption, procedural due process, and Section 1981. Id. at 556. The court rejected challenges
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and FHA. The court held that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the city adopted the facially neutral policy because of its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group. Id. at 540-41. Disparate impact alone is insufficient to invalidate a
statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 541.
50 Id. at 554 ("Federal law pre-empts [the ordinance provisions]. The ordinances disrupt
a well-established federal scheme for regulating the presence and employment of immigrants in the
United States. They violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and are
unconstitutional.").
51 See supra note 5.
52 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000)
("The
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other
than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for
employment, unauthorized aliens.").
53 See supra note 5.
54 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520 ("In the instant case, Hazleton suspends the business
permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate IRCA.").
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from suspending business permits for violations of a local ordinance.55
Therefore, IRCA preempted the Hazleton Ordinances that regulated
employment. 6
Additionally, the court held that federal law preempted the
Hazleton Ordinances' housing provisions because the ordinances
conflicted with federal officials' sole discretion to determine when to
remove unlawful immigrants. 7 The federal government allows certain
unlawful immigrants to work and live in the United States. These
immigrants include those who have completed asylum or withholding of
removal applications, those who have applied for permanent residency,
those who have applied to suspend their deportation, those temporarily
paroled in the United States for emergency or public interest reasons, and

those granted a deferred action of administrative convenience. 8 The
Hazleton Ordinances would deny these immigrants housing and
employment. Additionally, the Hazleton Ordinances obstructed federal
processes for determining citizenship or eligible immigration status,
interfering with the federal government's ability to address a national
problem comprehensively."
55

Id. at 519-20.
56 The court also rejected Hazleton's claims that the ordinance was constitutional
because it only applied to unlawful immigrants, who had no right to be in the United States. Id. at
529. The court noted the ordinance would affect everyone and contained no antidiscrimination
provisions. Id.
57 Id. at 533. For example, the Hazleton Ordinances, supra note 5, assume that the
federal government removes all unlawful immigrants. Id. at 531. However, federal law authorizes
the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal of an inadmissible or deportable immigrant under
certain circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)-(b) (2000). Under § 1229b(a), first, the United States
must have lawfully admitted the immigrant as a permanent resident for at least five years. Second,
the immigrant must have continuously resided in the United States for at least seven years,
regardless of the admission status. Third, the immigrant cannot be a convicted aggravated felon. If a
party establishes these elements, the Attorney General can cancel an immigrant's removal, but the
Hazleton Ordinances would prohibit the immigrant from securing employment or housing. See
Hazleton Ordinances, supra note 5. Thus, Hazleton's actions would directly conflict with the
Attorney General's policy decision.
58 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31. The federal government may also permit
immigrants with a final order of deportation to work under supervised release. Id. Further, the
federal government may release from detention immigrants who are sanctioned with a "final order[]
of removal" if it appears unlikely that immigration enforcement will promptly deport them. Id.
59 When an unlawful immigrant initiates the process to adjust his or her immigration
status, the immigrant typically lacks any documentation regarding his or her ability to remain in the
country. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
The Hazleton Ordinances, supra note 5, prohibited tenants from renting to these
immigrants, even though the immigrants made a conscious decision to seek eligible status for
remaining in the United States. Since federal law preempts laws that regulate who can and cannot
remain in an area, local governments have no authority to determine which immigrants are entitled
to reside in the United States. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). As a result, local
governments must allow unlawful immigrants in their jurisdiction until the federal government
orders their deportation. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("[T]he structure of immigration statuses makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens
are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 241 n.6
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal
Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be found to have a federal permission to
reside in the country .... ). Thus, the ordinance would prohibit individuals the federal government
allowed to remain in the United States from remaining in Hazleton. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
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Not only do immigrant housing ordinances conflict with federal
laws, they often conflict with state laws by compelling property owners
and managers to violate state-imposed duties.' Property leases expressly
specify the conditions under which a property owner or manager may
terminate a tenancy. 6 These leases also specify the processes for
terminating a tenancy. 2 Most lease provisions do not address a tenant's
immigration status.63 Therefore, to evict a tenant because of immigration

Additionally, immigration judges have exclusive authority to determine immigration
status. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(l) (2000) ("An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien."); § 1229a(a)(3) (stating that the proceeding
before an immigration judge is the "sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien
may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United
States"); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 533. The Hazleton Ordinances, supra note 5, compelled local
officials to determine a person's immigration status and to determine whether the immigrant was in
the United States lawfully. Since immigration judges retain this exclusive power, federal law
preempted the ordinance. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
60 See generally Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802 (Mo. 21st Jud. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 12, 2007) (invalidating a municipal ordinance due to conflicts with state law). In Valley
Park,the city exercised its police power to regulate employment and housing of immigrants. Id. at 2.
The enforcement provisions of the ordinance required Valley Park to suspend a property owner's
occupancy permit, forbade the property owner from collecting rents during the suspension period,
and prohibited the city from issuing new or renewal occupancy permits to property owners during
the suspension period. Valley Park Ordinance, supra note 5, § 5(B)(5); Valley Park, No. 06-CC3802, slip op. at 3.
Several parties, including property owners and a local equal housing opportunity
council, challenged the ordinance in state court. First Amended Petition for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief " 10-13, Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802 (Mo. Jud. Cir. Ct.
2007), availableat http://wwwaclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark-lstamendedpet.pdf (last visited
Sept. 11, 2008). The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance compelled local employers and property
owners to act as federal immigration officers and impeded local businesses' ability to operate. For
example, most property owners do not know their tenants' immigration status, do not want to
consider immigration status in rental decisions, and do not know how to enforce immigration
ordinances. Id. 1 10-12.
61 See, e.g., Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, supra note 8,1 18. The complaint noted
that:
[The property owner plaintiffs] rent their apartments pursuant to written lease agreements
that expressly state the terms and conditions under which they can evict a tenant or
terminate a tenancy. Their lease agreements do not provide that they cannot renew
current leases, many of which are month-to-month leases, on the ground that any
occupant of the apartment lacks "eligible immigration status."
Id. 1 18; see also Complaint, Stewart v. Cherokee County, No. 07-CV-0015 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2007)
at
available
Complaint],
County
Cherokee
[hereinafter
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/cherokee-complaint.pdf. According to the complaint in
Stewart:
[The plaintiff property owner] rents its units under written lease agreements that
expressly state the terms and conditions under which [the property owner] can evict a
tenant or terminate a tenancy. [The] lease agreements do not provide that [the property
owner] can evict any tenant on the ground that the tenant is an "illegal alien," nor do the
lease agreements provide for an eviction proceeding that is five (5) business days or less.
Id. 113.
62 See supra note 61.
63 Id.
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status, property owners and managers would breach leases with their
tenants and subject themselves state property remedies.'
In addition to lease provisions, state property laws also specify a
minimum notice that property owners and managers must provide
tenants before terminating a tenancy.65 Yet most ordinances compel
property owners and managers to evict an unlawful immigrant within
several days.' Likewise, state property laws often require property
owners and managers to utilize the judicial process to terminate a
tenancy.67 Yet again, many ordinances require property owners and
managers to independently determine a tenant's immigration status and
promptly evict any unlawful immigrant.68 Thus, to comply with the
municipal ordinances, property owners and managers must violate state
property laws.
B.

Many Local Efforts to Regulate Immigrant Housing Violate
Due ProcessRights

Local efforts to regulate immigrant housing violate procedural
due process rights69 because they do not provide affected parties
64 For example, if a property owner or manager deprives a tenant of the lease
in
contravention to the agreement, the tenant can sue for wrongful eviction. As one court explains:

[The property owner] had not reserved the right to terminate the lease, under any reserved
privilege, before the expiration, upon any ground whatever .... There is an obligation in
every contract of lease to deliver the property to the [property owner] at the expiration of
the lease, but it is an infringement upon personal rights, protected by law, to require a
tenant to vacate before expiration.
Wailer & Edmonds v. Cockfield, 35 So. 778, 778-79 (La. 1904). Property owners and managers that
wrongfully evict a tenant may be subject to treble damages, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-29 (1996)
("For forcibly ejecting or excluding a person from the possession of real property, the measure of
damages is three times such a sum as would compensate for the detriment caused to the person by
the act complained of."), or punitive damages. Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C. 1988)
("Punitive damages are available in actions for intentional torts such as wrongful eviction.").
65 E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.060 (West 2000) (requiring at least one month notice
before terminating certain leases); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 232-b (McKinney 2006) ("A monthly
tenancy or tenancy from month to month... may be terminated by the landlord or the tenant upon
his notifying the other at least one month before the expiration of the term of his election to
terminate."); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.001 (Vernon 2007) (requiring advance notice equivalent
to at least one rental period).
66 E.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No. 2006-18, § 5(B) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf; Valley Park Ordinance, supra
note 5, § 5(B) (compelling property owners to resolve violations within five business days).
67 E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.233 (West 2000) (requiring use of the judicial process to
remove a tenant).
68 See, e.g., Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f); Valley Park
Ordinance, supra note 5, § 5 (requiring property owners and managers to verify a tenant's eligible
immigration status prior to entering a lease).
69 The Constitution provides that no person may be "deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing due process protection against
the federal government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing due process protection against
state governments). Housing is property and procedural due process encompasses the doctrine that
the government must provide adequate safeguards when depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property to ensure that the process is fair. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 901 (1998)
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sufficient notice 71 or processes to review housing decisions. The right to
be heard is a cornerstone of due process. In order to protect this right, the
government must provide affected parties sufficient notice before
depriving them of a constitutional right." Yet these anti-immigrant
ordinances fail to provide adequate notice either to property owners and
managers or to tenants. A comprehensive regulatory approach would
protect this right through an all-inclusive regulatory program, rather than
piecemeal legislation with fundamental legal deficiencies.
Immigrant housing ordinances fail to provide property owners
and managers with any guidance on how to interpret ordinance
provisions or to determine citizenship or eligible immigration status.72
The ordinances are often too vague for property owners and managers to
interpret core terms, such as occupancy.73 Thus, property owners and
managers lack sufficient notice of their legal responsibilities and face
uncertainty regarding their exposure to civil and criminal penalties. Such
uncertainty interferes with due process rights to be notified of legal
obligations and expectations before being penalized for failing to meet
those obligations and expectations.
Additionally, the ordinances fail to provide tenants any notice
when a party challenges their housing eligibility. Under most ordinances,
there is no requirement to notify an affected tenant that someone has
filed a complaint.74 Other than providing initial eligibility documentation,
an affected tenant has no role in the process to determine initial or
continued housing eligibility. 75 Thus, it is possible that an affected tenant
(general discussion of procedural and substantive due process, noting that "[p]rocedural due process
guarantees that a state proceeding which results in a deprivation of property is fair").
70 See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 931 (1998) ("As a matter of due
process, parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right, they must first be notified. Consequently, notice is an essential element of due
process ....
").
71 See supra notes 69-70.
72 Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, supra note 8, 1 34.
73 The Farmers Branch ordinance states that:
For each family member, the family shall be required to submit evidence of citizenship or
immigration status only once during continuous occupancy. The owner and/or property
manager is prohibited from allowing the occupancy of any unit by any family which has
not submitted the required evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status [required
by the ordinance].
Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f)(4)(b). However, there is no procedure to
determine whether a property owner would violate the ordinance by merely permitting a resident to
allow a visiting friend or family member to stay with them.
74 As the court in Lozano v. City ofHazleton explained:
First and foremost, the Ordinance does not provide any notice whatsoever to a tenant who
is the subject of a challenge. An ordinance which could cause people to lose their
residences but provides them no notice before eviction certainly does not meet the
requirements of due process. Thus, the determination [of the tenant's housing eligibility]
can be made without the challenged individual's participation at all.
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 538 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
75 See id.
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would have no knowledge of a challenge until the housing complex
evicted the tenant. This lack of notice deprives tenants of their property
without due process of law.
Further, local efforts to regulate immigrant housing fail to
provide sufficient process to either deprive people of their protected
rights or review the decisions made under the ordinances. Since
procedural due process seeks to assure that deprivations of protected
rights are justified,76 it requires fair procedures to both deprive
immigrants of the right and to review the final decision. Three factors
affecting the process the government must provide include: (1) "the
private interest that will be affected by the official action," (2) "the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards," and (3) the government's interest.77
With immigrant housing ordinances, the jeopardized private
interest is substantial. First, the Fourteenth Amendment protects property
rights for the duration of a lease.78 Second, sustained housing is critical to
individual well-being. The Fourteenth Amendment also protects property
owners' and managers' interest in rental income from the property.79
Rental income may be critical to property owners and managers who rely
on the income for their own well-being. Yet immigrant housing
ordinances jeopardize these private rights.
There is also a high risk of erroneously depriving immigrants of
these rights. The ordinances do not restrict who may file a complaint."
Thus, there are no safeguards to keep persons from abusing the housing
ordinances and harassing tenants or property owners and managers. The
ordinances also provide no procedure for establishing a complaint's
validity." When a complaint is "valid," the ordinance requires the
property owner or manager to provide the city with the tenant's
immigration documentation. 2 Yet there is neither a procedure for
76

77
78

See supra note 69.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 537 ("[T]enants have a property interest in their apartments

for the term of their lease." (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72 (1972))).
79 Id. ("[Tihe landlords also have an interest... in the rights to income on the
property.").
8o Id. at 534-35 ("A complaint can be filed by 'any official, business entity, or City
resident."' (quoting Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance No. 2006-18, § 5(B)(1) (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton-secondordinance.pdf)).
8
As the Lozano court explained:
If the complaint is considered valid - the Ordinance does not indicate how the validity of
a complaint is determined, it merely states that a complaint [that] alleges a violation
based upon national origin[], ethnicity, or race is invalid - the city obtains identity
information from the landlord and verifies with the federal government ... the
immigration status of the person at issue.
Id. at 537.
82

Id.
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verifying a tenant's immigration status, nor an explanation of what
"identity data" a property owner or manager must provide the city. 3
Thus, while there may be a hearing, such a procedure is inadequate if the
parties cannot adequately prepare.' Moreover, while these ordinances
provide property owners and managers a secondary hearing, the
ordinances do not provide tenants additional safeguards." Additionally,
even though the ordinances provide a hearing, a hearing is inadequate
because it seeks to determine an alien's eligible immigration status
without jurisdiction. 6 Immigration judges have exclusive power to
determine an alien's immigration status. 7
For these reasons, immigrant housing ordinances produce a high
risk of erroneously depriving an immigrant of constitutionally protected
rights. The ordinances do not provide immigrants or property owners and
managers either sufficient notice of their legal obligations or adequate
review of judicial determinations."
Additional procedural safeguards would provide tenants, as well
as property owners and managers, adequate protection. For example, if
tenants knew that someone was challenging their immigration status,
they could work with the property owner or manager to make sure all
current documentation was on file. Additionally, they would have some
advance notice of the housing threat. While this advance notice would
not safeguard against the loss of housing, it would allow tenants to begin
seeking alternative housing arrangements. 9 Further, if property owners
and managers knew what documentation was required, they could better
prepare for a hearing that might deprive them of valuable rental incomes.
Judicial review in a court with jurisdiction, which the federal government
could provide through a national regulatory program, would safeguard
Id. at 538.
94 For example, the Lozano court reasoned:
83

[T]he statute... does not state the nature of the "identity data" that is needed to verify
the tenant's immigration status. Therefore, the [property] owners are left not knowing
what documents they need for the "hearing." To provide for a hearing for which an
interested party cannot adequately prepare is a violation of due process.
Id.

85 Id. ("The owner/landlord can request a second or additional verification,
however, no
such right is provided to the affected tenant.").
86 See id. ("[T]he Pennsylvania courts do not have the authority to determine an alien's
immigration status. Such status can only be determined by an immigration judge. Once again, the
[ordinance] seeks to provide a remedy in a court that lacks jurisdiction.").
87 See id.
88 Thus, the Lozano court stated:

Because the [ordinance] does not provide notice to challenged ... tenants, does not
inform the ... owners/landlords of the types of identity information needed, and provides
for judicial review in a court system that lacks jurisdiction, [the ordinance] violates the
due process rights of... tenants and owners/landlords. It is therefore unconstitutional.
Id.
89

See infra text accompanying notes 107-109.
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both tenants' and property owners' and managers' rights to be heard.
These additional procedural safeguards would significantly reduce the
risk of erroneously depriving immigrants of constitutionally protected
rights. While local governments have a legitimate interest in protecting
the welfare of local citizens, that interest does not supersede individual,
constitutionally protected rights.
C.

Many Local Efforts to Regulate Immigrant Housing Violate
Equal ProtectionRights

While local efforts to regulate immigrant housing infringe on
equal protection rights,' an equal protection challenge is not likely to
succeed because the courts provide rational basis9" deference to equal
protection challenges of immigrant housing ordinances.92 The United
States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection
Clause following the Civil War.93 The purpose of the clause was to
require that government classifications separating people for different
treatment be justified by a sufficient purpose.' While the original
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to provide oversight of
classifications based on race, the Supreme Court eventually expanded the
clause's protections."
90 The Constitution prohibits state governments from "deny[ing] ... any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The use of the word
"persons" extends protections to all people within a state's jurisdiction, not just to United States or
state citizens. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 767 (3d ed.
2006) ("Aliens are protected from discrimination because the equal protection clause explicitly says
that no 'person' shall be denied equal protection of the laws. The clause does not mention the word
'citizen'....").
The basic concept of equal protection mandates state governments to treat all similarly
situated persons equally. 16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 777 (1998). Thus, equal protection
deals with classifications of persons that are either included or excluded from a statutory program.
Id. § 778. An equal protection challenge has three questions: "What is the classification? What level
of scrutiny should be applied? Does the particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?"
CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 670.
91 Rational basis is one of the three applicable levels of equal protection scrutiny. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 671-73. The rational basis test is minimal and the court will uphold
the law "if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. at 672. Courts generally
apply strict scrutiny to laws based on race, national original, and alienage. Id. at 671. In contrast to
rational basis deference, under strict scrutiny the government bears the burden of proof and courts
will only uphold the law if it is "necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose." Id.
See, e.g., Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection
challenge after applying the rational basis test).
93 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 13. ("The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in
1868 largely to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves and in its most important provisions says
that no state can deny any person [the] equal protection of the laws .... ").
94 Id. at 669 ("All equal protection cases pose the same basic question: Is the
government's classification justified by a sufficient purpose?").
95 See id. at 695 ("The Court long has recognized that the primary purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect African-Americans; in fact, the initial Supreme Court
decisions construing the equal protection clause suggested that it could be used only to protect
blacks."); id. at 766-77 (reviewing the protections recognized against classifications based on
alienage).
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Yet because classifications based on unlawful presence in the
United States are not suspect,96 courts apply the deferential rational basis
test to equal protection challenges.97 However, immigrant housing
ordinances hurt unintended victims-unlawful immigrants' children.
Many of these children are U.S. citizens,98 and their circumstances as
children of illegal immigrants draw striking parallels to the situation in
Plyler v. Doe."
In Plyler, the Supreme Court held that states cannot limit
funding for public education to children lawfully present in the United
States." Although the Court did not apply strict scrutiny, it applied more
than a rational basis review.'' The Court stated that it was wrong to
punish blameless children for their parents' wrongdoings, 1"2 acts over
which the children had no control." 3 The Court recounted the reasoning
of the district court, which stated that "the illegal alien of today may well
be the legal alien of tomorrow," and that refusing these children
education would permanently condemn them to the "lowest socioeconomic class."'" After Texas claimed that its purpose in excluding the

96

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) ("Undocumented aliens cannot be treated

as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a
'constitutional irrelevancy."').
97 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 542
(M.D. Pa. 2007)
("[O]ur equal protection analysis must only explore whether [the ordinance] has 'a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.' We agree with the [city] that the ordinances meet this
standard.") (citation omitted).
98 Several of the plaintiffs challenging immigrant housing ordinances
have been United
States citizen-children of unlawful immigrants. Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, supra note 8, l
10-12 (five plaintiffs were United States citizen-children living in apartment complexes with family
members, some of whom were neither United States citizens nor resident immigrants); Cherokee
County Complaint, supra note 61, 17 (five of the seven anonymous plaintiffs were parents with
minor children that were United States citizens).
99 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 230 (invalidating a Texas statute that prohibited
funding
for public education to unlawful immigrant children).
100 Id. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a
showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.").
101 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 775-76 (commenting that while the court did not
apply strict scrutiny, it was "clear that [the Court] was using more than a rational basis review"
because the state's arguments would otherwise have satisfied a rational basis test).
102 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 ("Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of
adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against
his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.").
103 Id. ("[T]he children ... in these cases 'can affect neither their parents' conduct nor
their own status."' (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977))).
104 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 577 (E.D. Tex. 1978). In its entirety, the Supreme
Court noted that the district court had concluded that:
[Under current laws and practices "the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien
of tomorrow," and that without an education, these undocumented children, "[a]lready
disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable
racial prejudices ....
will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic
class.
Plyler,457 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 577) (footnote omitted).
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children of unlawful immigrants was to reduce public education costs,""
the Court held that the means were not rational for accomplishing the
stated purpose." °
With immigrant housing ordinances, the impact on immigrants'
children is profound. For instance, when someone challenges a family's
housing eligibility, the property owner or manager must evict the family
with little notice." An affected family is unlikely to find convenient,
suitable housing alternatives because all housing complexes face the
same legal obligations to verify eligibility."'s Further, the short notice
provides the family little time to locate housing shelters. Even if shelters
were available, the ordinances provide no exceptions to verification
requirements." o Thus, by accepting homeless immigrant families,
housing shelters would subject themselves to civil and criminal penalties.
It follows that a displaced family's only option may be to
relocate to another jurisdiction. Yet moving a family has its own
problems. By nature of being unlawfully present in the United States,
many of these immigrants work illegally. Their wages are dismal,1"' and
families may lack the financial resources to move. For these families,
there is no way out. Once a family loses shelter, the income-generators
are likely to be too preoccupied finding replacement shelter to continue
working. Once the family's income ceases, the family will lose the
ability to sustain itself, and the only choice may be to look to the U.S.
government to initiate deportation proceedings. "1 ' Deportation may result
in removing parents or other family members from the United States,
while leaving the U.S. citizen children behind. It is an injustice to tear
families apart because of their immigration status.
While these immigrant housing cases parallel Plyler, a critical
distinction allows courts to apply the rational basis review. In Plyler, the

105 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 (noting that the purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the
"state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents").
106 See supra note
100.
107 E.g., supra Part I.B.
108 Some of the ordinances provide limited exemptions for single-family homes. For

example, the Farmers Branch Ordinance, only applies to complexes with three or more apartments.
Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-111. It does not apply to single-family rental homes
or buildings with less than three apartment units. Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, supra note 8,
36.
109 Some ordinances only apply to apartment complexes with a minimum number of units.
See supra note 108.
Ito See generally David Crary, Immigrants Face Low Wages, Poor Treatment in
Obscurity: Some are Exploited as They Work as Nannies, Maids for the Wealthy, THE GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 4, 2007, at A14 (discussing the poor working conditions and treatment of many
female immigrants).
III The housing ordinances would continue to prohibit complexes from renting housing to
unlawful immigrants that had turned themselves in to the U.S. government and initiated the process
to adjust their immigration status. See supra note 59.
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classifications directly targeted children." 2 The state distinguished
among children based on their immigration status to determine
educational funding." 3 With immigrant housing ordinances, in contrast,
the classification rests with immigration status alone, and the
classification does not single out children." 4 Because the classifications
only distinguish persons on immigration status, which targets both adults
and children, the rational basis review applies." 5
Clearly, local efforts to regulate immigrant housing have drastic
affects not only on unlawful immigrants, but also on U.S. citizens. The
best way to confront these problems is through comprehensive and
uniform federal regulation, not through piecemeal local efforts.
D.

Local Efforts to Regulate Immigrant HousingAre Costly,
Destroy Local Camaraderie,and Stifle Economic Development

Immigrant housing ordinances are extremely costly, destroy
local camaraderie, and stifle economic development. These unanticipated
results factored into the eventual abolishment of ordinances in
Escondido, California" 6 and Riverside, New Jersey." 7 After Escondido
enacted an immigrant housing ordinance, it quickly realized that the
litigation costs associated with the challenge were astronomical. The city
112

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (noting that the Texas law withheld "from

local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not 'legally admitted'
into the United States").
113 See id.
114 E.g., Cherokee County Ordinance, supra note 5, § 3(a) (prohibiting property owners
and managers from letting, leasing or renting housing to an "illegal alien," or permitting an "illegal
alien" to occupy any housing).
115 See supra note 49.
116 Escondido enacted an immigrant housing ordinance under its police power in response
to concerns that renting housing to immigrants caused problems in the city. Escondido Ordinance,
supra note 5, § 1; Statement Regarding Escondido Actions Approving Stipulation for Final
Judgment and Permanent Injunction 1 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Escondido Statement],
to
("[T]he
rental of
housing
http://www.ci.escondido.ca.us/immigration/Statement.pdf
undocumented immigrants... result[s] in a number of problems for the City."). The ordinance
prohibited property owners from renting housing to illegal aliens and from permitting unlawful
immigrants to occupy any dwelling. Escondido Ordinance, supra note 5, § 3. The ordinance
authorized a separate violation for each adult on each day and authorized fines, suspension of the
business license, and a prohibition on collecting any rents. Id.
117 Riverside enacted an immigrant housing ordinance under its police power, claiming
that the local community demanded the township combat illegal immigration. Riverside Ordinance,
supra note 5, § 2(B) (claiming to be "empowered and mandated by the people.., to abate the
nuisance of illegal immigration"). The Riverside Ordinance regulated employment and housing of
imnuigrants. Id. §§ 4, 5.
While the Riverside Ordinance was similar to other immigrant housing ordinances, its
reach went much further. The ordinance stated that any violation within the United States was a
violation under the ordinance. Id. § 4(B). The ordinance made it a violation to hire, or attempt to
hire, or to rent or lease property to unlawful immigrants, or to fund or aid in the establishment of a
day laborer center that does not verify legal work status. Id. § 4(A). Thus, if a Riverside entity rented
an apartment to an unlawful immigrant in California, or funded a day laborer center that did not
verify legal work status in Texas, the entity would violate the Riverside Ordinance and would be
subject to extreme penalties. Id. §§ 4, 5.

2008]

PROBLEMS WITH IMMIGRANT HOUSING ORDINANCES

attorney's fees could have exceeded $1 million, a figure that excluded
the risk of liability for plaintiff-attorney's fees."' This cost was a major
factor persuading the Escondido City Council to settle the litigation that
challenged the ordinance." 9 In addition to litigation costs, cities must pay
for administering ordinances, and many cities lack the necessary funding
to do so. 2° Thus, by enacting an immigrant housing ordinance, cities
subject themselves to significant litigation and administrative costs that
the city could better spend elsewhere.
Immigrant housing ordinances also destroy local camaraderie
and stifle economic development. After Riverside enacted an immigrant
housing ordinance, nearly 20% of the population left the town within two
weeks.' This mass exodus forced many local businesses to close, and
some of the remaining businesses experienced sales drops of nearly

118
119

See Escondido Statement, supra note 116, at 2.
Another problem with the Escondido Ordinance, supra note 5, was that the

enforcement provisions lacked any supportable process to determine an immigrant's status. See
Escondido Statement, supra note 116, at 1 (listing one of the serious problems with the ordinance as
its "lack of an assured federal database to determine the status of individuals for housing purposes").
Unfortunately, the City Council and district court stated that the decision on the
ordinance was not precedential and did not bind future Escondido City Councils or other United
States municipalities. See Escondido Order, supra note 116, at 2 ("[The] stipulated judgment is not
an admission or finding of liability and shall not constitute a final determination on the merits of any
issue. Nor shall this judgment have any res judicata, collateral estoppel, or preclusive effect as to any
third party claim, action or proceeding."); Escondido Statement, supra note 116, at 3 (noting that
"abandoning the present litigation.., leaves.., the Council ... with complete future legislative
discretion" and that "the decisions made with respect to this Ordinance and this litigation have no
binding effect whatsoever on any other litigation or measures which may be pending in other parts of
the country"). For this reason, the Escondido City Council could change its mind in the future and
reenact another anti-immigrant ordinance.
Yet the lack of precedential power averts several problems, most importantly that of
prohibiting a decision without any fact-finding from becoming precedential. Seemingly, the court
reached its decision on the joint stipulation of all parties without any fact-finding. See Escondido
Order, supra note 116. The adversarial process is central to the United States judicial system. In re
Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 785-86 (N.C. 2003) (discussing the adversarial system and its concern for
judging the rights of parties on the truth alone). This adversarial process provides for adverse parties
to fully explore and argue issues. The process increases the likelihood of reaching a legitimate and
fair end-result. It would not be good policy to view a decision on an unexplored issue as
precedential. As such, the district court averted these problems by expressly limiting the impact of
its decision.
120 See, e.g., Stephanie Sandoval, Campaigns Close to Closure in FB: Rival Farmers
Branch Committees Sound Off on Rental Ordinance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 29, 2007, at IB
(local political action committee commenting that "Farmers Branch doesn't have the training,
expertise or financial resources to handle the issue of illegal immigration. That's why tax money
goes to Washington").
While it is definitely possible for a city or county to have better resources than the
federal or state governments, it is unlikely. The federal and state governments typically have a much
larger tax base than cities or counties. Yet when enacting an immigrant housing ordinance, Cherokee
County, Ga. stated that "[t]he state and federal government lack the resources to properly protect the
citizens of Cherokee County from the adverse effects of the harboring of illegal aliens, and the
criminal activities of some illegal aliens." Cherokee County Ordinance, supra note 5, § 1(6).
121 Maria Panaritis & Sam Wood, Riverside to Repeal Immigrant Laws: After an Exodus
of Brazilian Residents, Officials Plan to End Penalties Sought for Hiring and Housing Those Here
Illegally, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 23, 2007, at B01.
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50%.22 When residents, whether legal or illegal, leave a community in

response to these ordinances, the local population suffers because of
reduced business and tax revenue.'23
III.

CHALLENGING IMMIGRANT HOUSING ORDINANCES IS MOST
PRACTICAL UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND SECTION 1981

This Note argues that because of the legal deficiencies with
immigrant housing ordinances, 4 the most practical challenges to them
arise under FHA and Section 1981. FHA prohibits housing practices that
have a discriminatory effect on parties because of race, color, or national
origin."' Thus, while an equal protection challenge requires proof of
discriminatory intent,"' courts have interpreted FHA more broadly." 7
Additionally, Section 1981 prohibits parties from restricting any person's
28
right to enter a contract because of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
As a result, Section 1981 prohibits any state or municipal law that
forbids a property owner or manager from entering leases with unlawful
immigrants." 9 This Note argues that in comparison to a preemption, due
process or equal protection challenge, plaintiffs face a lower bar to
establish wrongdoing under FHA and Section 1981. It follows that the
most practical means to challenge these immigrant housing ordinances
are FHA and Section 1981. By doing so, plaintiffs can defeat local
piecemeal efforts to regulate immigrant housing and thereby encourage a
uniform, national approach to a common problem.

122

Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Businesses Sue Riverside, NJ Over

Vague,
Discriminatory
Anti-Immigrant
Ordinance
(Oct.
18,
2006),
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrini/27107prs2006l0l8.html.
123 See Dwight Ott & Sam Wodd, Riverside Twp. Repeals Illegal-Immigrant Law, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.philly.cominquirer/local/nj/9350767.htm; see also Belson &
Capuzzo, supra note 15 (discussing local housing ordinances regulating immigration, the impacts on
local businesses, and the high costs of continued litigation).
124 See supra PartII.
125 E.g., Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 963 (7th Cir.
1996) ("[A]
procedure, neutral on its face, may not be applied in a discriminatory manner ....
")(citing United
States v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 37 F.3d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1994)); see generally John E.
Theuman, Annotation, Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Alone as Sufficient to Prove, or to
Establish Prima Facie Case of Violation of Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.), 100
A.L.R. FED. 97 (1990) (surveying federal court decisions on whether discriminatory effect or intent
is required to recover under FHA).
126 See supra Part II.C.
127 See supra note 116.
128 See infra Part III.B.
129 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 548 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("[S]ection
1981 forbids the defendant from prohibiting undocumented aliens from entering into leases. Thus,
[the Hazleton Ordinances], which forbid such contracts, are in violation of section 198 L.").
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FairHousing Act

Congress enacted FHA 13 ° to provide fair housing throughout the
nation and to prohibit all public and private racial discrimination in the
sale and rental of real property. 3' The reach of FHA is broad, covering
130

FHA provides:

[I]t shall be unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color.., or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color ... or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color.., or national origin, or
an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color.., or national origin that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by
representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person
or persons of a particular race, color.., or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000).
131 United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The Fair Housing [Act]
was designed to provide fair housing throughout the nation and is a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges and incidents of slavery."); see also 15
AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 380 (2000) (reviewing the general purpose and goal of FHA).
While Congress enacted the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments in response to
widespread racial evils prior to the Civil War, many Southern states eroded the Amendments' impact
through other segregation practices. See Civil Rights Movement, 3 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA MICROP/EDIA READY REFERENCE 339, 339 (2005). In response to continued
discrimination, the Civil Rights movement went on the offensive to challenge these discriminatory
practices. See id. The movement exploded in the late 1950s, and in response, Congress passed FHA
as one of several pieces of legislation targeted at eradicating racial discrimination. See id. Congress
had previously passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was one of the most important civil rights
laws in United States history. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000); see
Civil Rights Movement, supra, at 339.
Congress passed FHA under its Thirteenth Amendment enumerated power to eradicate
the evils of slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § 2; Hunter, 459 F.2d at
214 ("The Fair Housing [Act] was designed to provide fair housing throughout the nation and is a
valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges and
incidents of slavery."); see 15 AM. JuR. 2D Civil Rights § 380 (reviewing the general purpose and
goal of FHA). In order to affect Congress' intent to ban racial discrimination in the sale and rental of
real property, courts must give generous construction to FHA's broad and inclusive language.
Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[W]e recognize
that the language of the Act is 'broad and inclusive' and must be given a 'generous construction."'
(quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972))); see also 15 AM. JUR. 2D
Civil Rights § 380 (reviewing the general purpose and goal of FHA). Thus, any state or municipal
law that encourages racial discrimination in the sale and rental of real property is invalid.
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2000) ("[A]ny law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction
that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under
this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid."); see also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 380
(reviewing the general purpose and goal of FHA).
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most dwellings and protecting any person seeking to rent or purchase a
dwelling, regardless of immigration status.'32 While there is a limited
exemption for single-family homes, the exemption does not extend to
apartment complexes."' Thus, apartment complex owners and managers
must comply with FHA provisions.
Immigrant housing ordinances injure both tenants and property
owners, and both groups have standing to challenge the ordinances under
FHA.'34 The ordinances harm tenants because they disparately impact
minority renters. Further, the ordinances infringe on tenants' rights to
enjoy a diverse community.'35 They harm property owners and managers,
in contrast, because they are too vague.'36 Property owners and managers
lack sufficient notice and guidance regarding their new legal obligations.'37
132

See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2000) (defining "person" as "one or more individuals,

corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases
under title 11, receivers, and fiduciaries"); id. § 3603(a) (dwellings affected by FHA); id. § 3604
(defining unlawful practices under the statute).
133 Id. § 3603(b)(1) (providing the limited single-family home exemption, which
depends
on how many single-family homes the owner owns at one time, and limiting the owner to only one
exemption during any twenty-four month period, excluding properties sold or rented through the
assistance of an estate broker, agent or salesman, and others).
134 FHA provides a cause of action to any aggrieved person, including both those already
injured by a discriminatory housing action or those that a discriminatory housing action threatens
with

imminent

injury.

ROBERT

G.

ScHwEMM,

HOUSING

DISCRIMINATION

LAW

AND

LITIGATION § 12A:1 (2008). FHA defines an aggrieved person as anyone who: "(1) claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by
a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). Additionally, FHA
provides broad standing:
Standing under the Fair Housing Act is as broad as permitted by Article III of the
Constitution .... To satisfy the Article III standing requirement, a party must establish
three elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the
challenged conduct, and (3) likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.
Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 593 (10th Cir. 1996); see also 15
AM. JUR. 20 Civil Rights § 460 (reviewing the general standing requirements to challenge an action
under FHA).
A challenge under FHA generally follows the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
regime, which the Supreme Court established for Title VII employment discrimination claims.
SCHWEMM, supra, § 10:6; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973)
(establishing the burden shifting regime, under which: (1) the plaintiff must make out the prima facie
case of unlawful conduct; (2) upon which the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
lawful reason for the action; (3) upon which the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to articulate
reasons that the defendant's justifications are pretext).
135 As the Supreme Court has explained:
They-the two tenants-claimed they had been injured in that (1) they had lost the social
benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and
professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of
minority groups; (3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social,
business, and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents of a "white
ghetto."
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
136 See supra Part I.B.
137 See supra Part 11.B.
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Thus, in an effort to comply with local regulations, they may incidentally
violate federal laws. Property owners and managers face a basic
dilemma: they may abide by federal laws and risk violating local ordinances,
or they may abide by local ordinances and risk violating federal laws.
1. Tenants
FHA provides tenants with broad protection by prohibiting
property owners and managers from engaging in discriminatory housing
practices, including practices that disparately impact minority tenants.'38
Immigrant housing ordinances do not facially discriminate against
minority tenants. In fact, most ordinances include provisions that
expressly prohibit complaints based on race, color, or national origin.'39
Rather, the ordinances draw distinctions between lawful and unlawful
immigrants.'" Yet these ordinances violate FHA because they have a
disparate impact on minority tenants.
Under a disparate impact challenge, tenants must show that a
policy, procedure, or practice disparately impacts members of a protected
class.'

A municipal housing ordinance is an official policy because it

dictates which persons are eligible to rent housing. The ordinances also
disparately impact members of a protected class. The housing ordinances
only apply to apartment complexes, exempting single-family homes and
small-scale apartments.'42 Yet minorities often disproportionately reside
in apartment complexes.'43 For example, 42% of Latino families in

Farmers Branch live in apartment complexes,'" compared to 14% of
white non-Hispanic families. 145 Clearly, where Latino families are three
times more likely to reside in an apartment complex, an ordinance
regulating those complexes will produce a disparate impact. Statistical
138

See SCHWEMM, supra note 134, § 10:1 (noting the similarity between Title VII and

FHA claims, and that both provide causes of action for "disparate treatment... (discriminatory
intent)" and for "disparate impact... (discriminatory effect)").
139 E.g., Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f)(4)(c) ("These provisions
shall be applied uniformly and in a nondiscriminatory manner. The owner and/or property manager's
application of these provisions must not differ based on the person's race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, disability, or familial status.").
140 E.g., id. § 26-116(f) (requiring property owners and managers to document a
prospective tenant's eligible immigration status prior to entering a lease with the prospective tenant).
141 Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The relevant
question in a discriminatory effects claim.., is whether a policy, procedure, or practice specifically
identified by the plaintiff has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a
protected class.").
142 For example, the Farmers Branch Ordinance applies to "apartment complexes," and
Farmers Branch defines an apartment complex as "any building or portion thereof which is rented,
leased or let to be occupied for compensation as three or more dwelling units or which is occupied as
a home or place of residence by three or more families living in independent dwelling units located
in the city." Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 5, § 26-116(f). The ordinance would not cover
single-family homes or buildings with less than three apartments or families.
143 Farmers Branch Verified Complaint, supra note 8, 1 25.
144 Id.
145

Id.
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evidence is essential to establish a disparate impact claim.146 FHA thus
provides a practical tool for challenging immigrant housing ordinances,
so long as there is sufficient statistical evidence to support the claim.
While immigrant housing ordinances do not facially
discriminate, there is a significant risk that property owners and
managers will enforce the ordinances in a discriminatory manner.147
Faced with new legal obligations to comply with local ordinances and
insufficient guidance on these new legal responsibilities, property owners
and managers will likely implement a blanket policy to decline housing
to certain types of renters.'48 Such action will inherently consider a
person's race, color, or national origin, which FHA expressly prohibits. 49
Since FHA prohibits discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral
ordinances, property owners and managers who implement a blanket "no
rent" policy would violate federal law.
Additionally, through both the disparate impact on minorities
and the risk of discriminatory enforcement, immigrant housing
ordinances prevent tenants from enjoying a diverse community. 5 °
Exposure to diversity provides people with a competitive advantage. 5'
146 See SCHWEMM, supra note 134, § 10:6 ("The key to proving a disparate impact claim

is statistical evidence showing that the defendant's policy or practice has a greater impact on
protected class members than on others.").
147 See, e.g., Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1996); see
generally Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 924-25 (6th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that FHA prohibits discriminatory application of an ordinance).
148 Property owners and managers might decline to rent to any person who appears to be
an unlawful immigrant. Further, if a property owner is unsure of a person's immigration status or
simply does not want to go through the trouble to verify the person's status, the property owner
might decline to enter a lease with the prospective tenant.
149 See SCHWEMM, supra note 134, § 10:2 ("Discrimination based on intentional
consideration of [race, color, or national origin] is illegal, even if the defendant was not motivated by
personal prejudice or racial animus.").
Under FHA, injured parties may use either direct or circumstantial evidence to
establish their claim. See id. Disparate treatment claims also follow the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. See id.
150 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) ("The [FHA] definition
of 'person aggrieved' ... is defined as '(a)ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice."' (citation omitted)). In Trafficante, two tenants sued their landlord
for discriminating against nonwhite rental applicants, depriving them of the benefits of living in an
integrated community. Id. The district court dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiffs were not
within the protected class, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, noting
that FHA defines aggrieved persons broadly. Id.
151 Corporate America was one of the first groups to realize the benefits of diversity. For
example, Target Corporation states:
Our ability to recruit and hire people from diverse backgrounds to create a team with a
rich variety of strengths, perspectives and lifestyles is a key factor in our performance as
a company. Our ability to "know our guest" is greatly enhanced by employing team
members who reflect the diversity of the communities that we serve. We are comnmitted
to diversity because it is the right thing to do and because it gives us a competitive
advantage.
Target Corporate Responsibility Report 2007, at 10 (2007), available at http://sites.target.coml
images/corporate/about/responsibility-report/responsibility..report-full.pdf (last visited June 15,
2008).
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The Supreme Court, accordingly, has recognized the importance of
diversity in education, stating that "[t]he skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."' 5 2 A diverse
community includes all types of persons, including those of a different
race, color, ethnic origin, and immigration status. More importantly,
exposure to diversity in a community setting allows residents to interact
with neighbors informally in a familiar environment. This type of
interaction is more likely to foster valuable learning relationships.
Yet immigrant housing ordinances prohibit communities from
enjoying the diversity that immigrants provide.'53 Such ordinances, for
example, deprive the local community of social, business, and
professional advantages.' 54 With an ever-increasing immigrant population,
tomorrow's leaders need the skills to empathize and communicate with
all immigrants, both lawful and unlawful. However, immigrant housing
ordinances deprive tenants of the opportunity to develop these skills.
These discriminatory housing practices
intended to eradicate with FHA.'55 The housing
injure minorities and their neighbors by preventing
obtaining housing because of race, color, or national

are what Congress
ordinances'56 would
eligible renters from
origin.

2. Property Owners and Managers
Property owners and managers will likely violate FHA when
complying with immigrant housing ordinances. FHA prohibits property
owners and managers from refusing to sell or rent a dwelling to a person
because of race, color, or national origin."' Likewise, property owners
and managers cannot refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of property to
a person because of race, color, or national origin or otherwise make the
dwelling unavailable.'58 Yet local ordinances mandate, without guidance,
that property owners and managers refuse housing to unlawful immigrants.
Property owners and managers face difficulties complying with
these ordinances because they are vague and do not provide sufficient
152 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
153 Diversity includes exposure to both lawful and unlawful immigrants. After all, "the
illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow." Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 577
(E.D. Tex. 1978). In an increasingly global world, those people who have experiences with and
understandings of unlawful immigrant concerns will have a competitive advantage over their peers.
154 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
155See SCHWEMM, supra note 134, § 5:2 (reviewing the legislative history of FHA).
156 In addition to private parties, FHA applies to federal, state, and municipal
governments. SCHWEMM, supra note 134, § 12B:4.
157 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000) (noting that it is unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after
the making of a bona fide offer.., a dwelling to any person because of race, color ....
or national
origin").
158 Id. (noting that it is unlawful "to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color.., or national
origin").
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guidance on how to determine housing eligibility.'59 While the
ordinances specify some types of documentation and processes that
property owners may use to determine a person's immigration status, the
ordinances are far from comprehensive. Faced with insufficient guidance
on how to determine a prospective renter's immigration status, property
owners will likely resort to a blanket decision to refuse housing to
someone that might be an unlawful immigrant." 6 Such an action 16would
1
inherently consider race, color, or national origin and violate FHA.
Further, property owners and managers have no authority to
determine a prospective tenant's immigration status. 62 Under the
supremacy doctrine, federal immigration judges have the sole authority
to determine a person's immigration status.'63 Immigrant housing
ordinances injure property owners and managers because the ordinances
create legal obligations that these parties cannot satisfy without violating
federal law.
B.

Section 1981

Section 1981 forbids any public or private party from interfering
with unlawful immigrants' right to enter a lease. 1" Congress enacted
159 See supra Part Il.B.
160 See Campbell, supra note 20, at 1052 (arguing that local anti-immigrant ordinances
encourage "racial and ethnic profiling of persons seeking to contract with landlords").
161

FHA subjects a property owner that violates FHA to actual compensatory damages,

punitive damages, and opposing counsel's attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2000).
162 See supra note 59.
163 See supra Part II.A.
164 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). Section 1981 provides that:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts... and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens ....
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental
discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
Id.; see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 548 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Unlike the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, which only apply to governmental parties, Section 1981 applies to
both the government and private parties. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375, 387-88 (1982); see also 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 27 (2000) (reviewing the general
characteristics of Section 1981). Thus, there is no requirement for an act to be under color of law to
fall within Section 1981 prohibitions. Gen. Bldg. ContractorsAss'n, 458 U.S. at 387; see also 15
Am. JuR. 2D Civil Rights § 27 (2000) (reviewing the general characteristics of Section 1981).
Certain federal causes of action, such as Section 1983, require a party to act under
color of law to impose liability. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). "Color of law" is a legal term of art. The
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Section 1981 with the limited intent to eradicate widespread racial
discrimination following the Civil War.'65 While Section 1981 mandates
that all persons within U.S. jurisdiction be treated the same as "white
persons," Congress intended that Section 1981 protect all persons from
intentional discrimination because of race, ancestry, or ethnicity." Since
Section 1981 applies to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States, at a minimum it protects lawfully admitted resident aliens.'67
While the Supreme Court has not decided whether Section 1981 applies
to unlawful immigrants, the Middle District of Pennsylvania held it
applies to all aliens, regardless of immigration status. 68
While immigrant housing ordinances appear facially neutral and
only restrict housing arrangements with unlawful immigrants, the ordinances
disproportionately target minorities. 69 The ordinances have a disparate
impact on minorities, and there is a high probability that property
owners and managers will enforce the ordinances in a discriminatory
manner. 7 ' Because Section 1981 prohibits any party from distinguishing
persons based on ethnicity 7 ' when contracting, federal law prohibits the
ordinances.
Thus, since immigrant housing ordinances interfere with unlawful
immigrants' statutory rights to enjoy the same contractual privileges as
"white citizens,"' 72 Section 1981 bars the ordinances. Further, Section 1981
bars the ordinances because it would be impossible for property owners and
managers to comply with both the local ordinance and federal laws
concurrently. 7' 3

Supreme Court explains that, "[M]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (citations omitted); see also
James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
393, 415 n.99 (2003) (reviewing the definition of the term "color of law").
165 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) ('The legislative history of the 1866 Act
clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in
terms of racial equality."); see also 15 Am.JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 28 (2000) (commenting on the
limited scoe of Section 1981).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987).
167 § 1981(a); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) ("It has long been settled,
and it is not disputed here, that the term 'person' in this context encompasses lawfully admitted
resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States ....
").
168 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 547 ("[W]e find that aliens, regardless of their status under
the immigration laws, are persons under section 1981.").
6 See supra Part I.A.1; see also generally Campbell, supra note 20 (discussing local
immigration ordinances and their impact on Latinos).
170 See supra Part llI.A.1.
171 Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 ("[W]e have little trouble in concluding that
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to
intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.").
172

§ 1981.

173 See supra Part HA.
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CONCLUSION

State and municipal governments may neither slam their front
doors shut, nor gate-keep their communities by determining which immigrants
may enter and remain. 7 4 Unlawful immigration does impose costs on
state and municipal governments, and border communities may very well
bear those costs disproportionately. However, exporting immigration
costs to neighboring communities is no solution.'75 Rather, state and
municipal governments should coalesce around a unified plan and lobby
Congress to address the immigration problem comprehensively. A
comprehensive regulatory framework would avoid inconsistent regulation
from state and local governments. The framework would be more likely
to provide tenants and property owners notice of their legal obligations,
and would provide adequate and meaningful review. Congress has the
power to articulate a standard of scrutiny that addresses equal protection
concerns for immigrants. A federal statute, moreover, would represent
the cooperation and contributions of the nation as a whole. Since
immigration policies directly implicate political functions involving foreign
affairs and relations,' 76 a nationally accountable Congress is the appropriate

body to address these concerns.
Congress may take longer to act than state and municipal
governments would like. Thus, in the interim, state and municipal
communities are likely to elect at least some politicians running "tough
on immigration" campaigns. These politicians are likely to encourage state
and municipal regulations of immigrant housing. Yet this Note has discussed
the legal deficiencies with local regulations.'77 Because of these legal

deficiencies, local residents must challenge immigrant housing ordinances
under FHA and Section 1981V' In the end, a comprehensive, well-reasoned
approach to immigration will best address the national problem, while
ensuring that the United States' doors to the "tempest-tost"'79 remain open.
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